The IAEA also has tools to look for and investigate indications of clandestine nuclear facilities or undeclared imports of nuclear material, but it only has limited control over the actual effectiveness of those measures. In states with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has mechanisms in place to detect the diversion of declared material or the misuse of a declared facility more » for undeclared production, and it can adjust the frequency and intensity of those mechanisms to achieve specific detection probability and timeliness goals. A state may obtain such material either through diverting declared material, misusing a declared facility to produce undeclared material, producing undeclared material in a clandestine facility, illicitly importing undeclared material, or combinations of these actions. « lessĪcquisition path analysis is an important tool for developing safeguards strategies as it allows for the determination and assessment of all technically plausible paths a state may pursue to obtain weapons usable nuclear material. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be more » highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements.
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